# tfprovidercheck mit Homebrew installieren

Prüfe Installationswege, Executables, Metadaten und Sicherheitshinweise für tfprovidercheck in AI-Agent-Workflows.

## Installation

```sh
sudo av install brew:tfprovidercheck
```

Weitere Installationsbefehle:

### macOS

- Homebrew (100%):

```sh
brew install tfprovidercheck
```

  Evidenz: local Homebrew formula metadata

## Paketfakten

- **Paketschlüssel:** brew:tfprovidercheck
- **Paketmanager:** Homebrew
- **Version:** 1.0.7
- **Quellzusammenfassung:** CLI to prevent malicious Terraform Providers from being executed
- **Homepage:** <https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/tfprovidercheck>
- **Repository:** <https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/tfprovidercheck>
- **Zuletzt aktualisiert:** 2026-07-26T00:50:39+02:00
- **Generiert:** 2026-08-03T19:37:03+00:00

## Executables

- tfprovidercheck (Alias)

## Installationsverhalten

- Bottle: nicht verfügbar

## Version und Aktualität

- Seite generiert: 2026-08-03
- Manager-Version: 1.0.7
## Projektgeschichte und Nutzung

tfprovidercheck is a Terraform provider allow-list checker intended to prevent disallowed or malicious Terraform providers from being executed. Its README positions it as a security and governance tool to run after terraform init and before commands such as validate, plan, or apply.

### Projektgeschichte

The project was built around a simple policy model: read `terraform version -json`, compare provider names and optional version constraints against a YAML allow list, and fail when a disallowed provider appears. The README contrasts this with `.terraform.lock.hcl` and `required_providers`, arguing that those mechanisms do not provide the same centralized provider allow-list control.

### Adoptionsgeschichte

Adoption appears concentrated in CI and platform-engineering contexts. Homebrew packages tfprovidercheck as a bottled formula, while the README emphasizes GitHub Actions usage and environment-variable configuration for workflows where pull requests should not be able to tamper with the policy.

### Wie es verwendet wird

Typical usage pipes `terraform version -json` into `tfprovidercheck`, optionally passing `-config`. Configuration can come from a command-line path, `TFPROVIDERCHECK_CONFIG_BODY`, `TFPROVIDERCHECK_CONFIG`, or `.tfprovidercheck.yaml` in the current directory.

### Warum Paket-Nerds sich dafür interessieren

For package-focused infrastructure users, tfprovidercheck is notable because it treats Terraform providers as executable dependencies that need admission control. It packages that check as a small CLI suitable for CI images, Homebrew installs, and repository policy workflows.

### Zeitleiste

- 2025: GitHub tags list v1.0.6 in July and v1.0.7 in December.
- 2026: Homebrew formula metadata lists stable version 1.0.7 with bottled builds.

### Related projects

- Terraform CLI
- .terraform.lock.hcl
- Terraform required_providers
- GitHub Actions

### Quellen

- <https://formulae.brew.sh/api/formula/tfprovidercheck.json>
- <https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/tfprovidercheck#readme>
- <https://github.com/suzuki-shunsuke/tfprovidercheck/tags>


## Sicherheitshinweise

narrow executable package without higher-risk signals.

- **Geiger-Risiko:** grün / niedrig
- narrow executable package without higher-risk signals


## Configuration and credential file locations

These source-backed paths show where this package keeps local settings or durable credentials. Automic Vault can use them as review targets for secret scanning, migration, and command approval.


## Configuration files

- Unix: .tfprovidercheck.yaml

## Combined YAML source

View the package source record on GitHub. [combined/tfprovidercheck.yml](https://github.com/mxcl/pkgdb/blob/main/combined/tfprovidercheck.yml)


## Quellen

- pkg.so package database
- Geiger risk classifier
- curated configuration and credential file locations
- curated package history
- pkgdb category and tag curation
- cross-ecosystem install command graph